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THE RIGHT TO AN ARTICLE 9 DEFICIENCY
JUDGMENT WITHOUT 9-504 NOTICE OF
RESALE
INTRODUCTION

A continuing source of disagreement among the courts centers
on the interpretation of 9-504 of the UCC.1 Specifically, the difficult
question is whether a secured party after repossessing collateral
following a debtor's default may obtain a deficiency judgment 2 if the
secured party resells the collateral without notifying the debtor.
The purpose of this note is to analyze this question thoroughly.
In order to resolve this particular controversy, the relevant provisions of Article 9 will be mentioned and explained, the leading cases
decided under the Code will be discussed, pre-Article 9 law (which
has been relied upon by several courts) will be shown to be inapplicable, and finally, the merits of each argument will be presented,
analyzed and weighed.
Part V of Article 9 prescribes the procedures the secured party
must follow when the debtor defaults under a security agreement.
Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, the secured party has the
right to repossess the collateral after the debtor's default.' Assuming
1. All references will be made to the 1972 official text of the Uniform Commercial Code
[hereinafter cited as UCC and referred to as UCC].
2. In general, "deficiency" is that part of a secured obligation which remains after
crediting the original debt with net proceeds accruing from the sale of the security by the
creditor. Thus, a deficiency judgment is a judgment or decree for that part of a secured debt
not realized from the sale of the collateral. See Odmulgee Motor Sales Co. v. Prentice, 371
P.2d 723 (Okla. 1962).
3. UCC § 9-503 provides that
[u]nless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take possession
of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial
process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may proceed by action.
Sections 9-503 and 9-504 have been under vigorous constitutional attack. In Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), the Supreme Court held the Florida and Pennsylvania prejudgment replevin statutes unconstitutional. The Court held repossession of the collateral under
these statutes was a deprivation of a possessory interest in property without due process. Id.
at 70.
In Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), a district court ruled sections 9503 and 9-504 constitutionally defective in that the self-help provisions constituted takings
without due process of law. Id. at 616.
This attack on prejudgment remedies, even if successful, does not diminish the import~toPrzc d by this .=neo T a sprii ei nnrty may voluntarily
kd11u ,)f' ~
g the qUCt.C
receive possession of the collateral, or if a notice hearing is required, the secured party will
still receive possession of the collateral. This note assumes there has been a default and that
the secured party has received possession of the collateral. For a discussion of the impact of
the Fuentes decision on the Article 9 notice provisions, see Note, Article 9-Notice Provisions
Upon Default, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 535.
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the debtor has not exercised his right of redemption,4 and the secured party does not hold the collateral in lieu of the balance due,
the secured party may resell the collateral.'
In either a voluntary or compulsory sale, the secured party may
dispose of the collateral at a public or private sale.' The time, place
and manner of the disposition are governed by "commercial reasonableness." 7 Unless the collateral is perishable, threatens to decline
rapidly in value or is a type normally sold on a recognized market,
the secured party must give the debtor notice of the resale.' If the
collateral is to be sold publicly, the secured party must give reasonable notice of the time and place of the resale. 9 On the other hand, if
the collateral is to be sold privately, the secured party must only
give reasonable notice of the time after which the private sale is to
be made. 0 In the case of consumer goods," no further notification
is required. In other cases, the secured party must send notification
to any other secured party from whom written notice of a claim of
interest in the collateral has been received. 2
If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the debtor is
4. UCC § 9-506 provides that
the debtor. . . may. . . redeem the collateral by tendering fulfillment of all obligations secured by the collateral as well as the expenses reasonably incurred by the
secured party in retaking, holding and preparing the collateral for disposition, in
arranging for the sale, and to the extent provided in the agreement and not prohibited
by law, his reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses.
5. According to UCC § 9-505, if the secured party elects to return the collateral in lieu
of the balance, the indebtedness is discharged. UCC § 9-504 further provides that
[a]secured party after default may sell, lease or otherwise dispose of any or all of
the collateral in its then condition or following any commercially reasonable preparation or processing.
6. UCC § 9-504(3) provides that the "[d]isposition of the collateral may be by public
or private proceedings and may be made by way of one or more contracts."
7. According to UCC § 9-504(3),
[s]ale or other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels and at any time and place
and on any terms but every aspect of the disposition including the method, manner,
time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable.
8. Id. The purpose of the notice is to allow the debtor sufficient time to take the
necessary measures to protect his interest either by taking part in the sale or by procuring
others to do so. See UCC § 9-504, Comment 5.
9. UCC § 9-504(3).
10. Id. Because it is assumed that in a private sale the debtor will not repurchase the
collateral, but rather that it will be sold through regular commercial channels, the debtor
need not be given the same exact notice as to time and place as that required for public sales.
See UCC § 9-504, Comment 1.
11. According to UCC § 9-109, goods are consumer goods "if they are used or bought
for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes."
12. UCC § 9-504(3).
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liable for any deficiency. In cases of sales of accounts or chattel
paper,' 3 the debtor is liable for a deficiency only if the security
agreement expressly so provides.' 4
The Code provides a remedy for the failure of the secured party
to comply with the resale provisions of 9-504.15 If the disposition is
completed and the secured party has not complied with the requirements, the debtor has the right to recover the resulting damages.'
Article 9 does not, however, explicitly discuss the effect of the secured party's failure to comply with the resale provisions on his
subsequent right to a deficiency judgment."
CASES DECIDED UNDER THE UCC

Courts which have decided this controversy under the Code
provisions are hopelessly split; four different approaches have been
taken by the various courts. Some courts indicate that the failure
to comply with the notice requirements of 9-504(3) does not preclude the secured party from obtaining a deficiency judgment.
Other courts accept this basic position but further state that in the
deficiency judgment suit the secured party has the burden of proving that the price obtained at the sale was the fair market value of
the collateral. A third line of cases denies a deficiency judgment
altogether. Finally, a small number of Georgia decisions deny deficiency judgments by holding that the secured party's failure to give
the debtor notice resulted in an "accord and satisfaction."
Cases Allowing Deficiency Judgments
A case for the proposition that the failure to give 9-504(3) notice
does not result in a forfeiture of the secured party's right to a deficiency judgment is Grant County TractorCo. v. Nuss.'5 Therein the
secured party brought a deficiency suit on a contract and security
agreement covering the sale of farm equipment after he had repossessed and sold one piece of the collateral without notifying the
13. Article 9 applies to any sale of accounts or chattel paper. See UCC § 9-102(1)(b).
14. UCC § 9-504(2).
15. The remedy is found in UCC § 9-507.
16. UCC § 9-507(1). In respect to consumer goods, a penalty of at least the credit
service charge plus ten percent of the principal amount of the debt or the time price differential plus ten percent of the cash price is imposed. See UCC § 9-507(1).
17. The question is not discussed either in the Code comments or in its unofficial
o..imatari.
2 C.
......SEC'UMIT !NTERES9 1W PRANAT. PROpERTY 1264 n.8 (1965).
18. 6 Wash. App. 866, 496 P.2d 966 (1972).
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debtor.' 9 The court concluded that the collateral was "equipment"
and that the secured party was authorized to resell it under 9-504.20
Even though the secured party failed to give the required notice, he
did not forfeit his right to a deficiency judgment.2' The court based
its decision on 9-507(1), explaining that since the remedy of damages is specifically provided, the drafters of the Code did not intend
the forfeiture of the secured party's right to a deficiency judgment
to act as an additional penalty.22
In Norton v. National Bank2 3 an automobile dealer sold a car
to a purchaser who signed a promissory note and a conditional sales
contract. The dealer then sold the chattel paper to a bank with
recourse. 4 The purchaser ultimately defaulted and the bank repossessed the car. Without notifying either the dealer or the purchaser,
the bank resold the car at a private sale.25 Subsequently the bank
sought a deficiency judgment." The court reasoned that the dealer
was a "debtor" within the meaning of 9-504 and was entitled to
notice of the resale. 7 The bank's failure to give notice, however, did
not result in the forfeiture of its right to a deficiency judgment; 8
rather, the court felt that the debtor could sufficiently recover his
2
damages under 9-507(1). 1
The court added that in the suit for a deficiency judgment the
secured party would have the burden of showing that the actual
price obtained at the resale was equal to the amount which would
have been realized had the debtor been given proper notice. 0 In the
absence of such proof, a presumption that the collateral was worth
the amount of the outstanding indebtedness would prevail. 3 '
19. Id. at 869, 496 P.2d at 968.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 870, 496 P.2d at 969.
22. Id. See also Atlas Credit Corp. v. Dolbow, 193 Pa. Super. 649, 165 A.2d 704 (1961);
Mallicoat v. Volunteer Fin. & Loan Corp., 57 Tenn. App. 106, 415 S.W.2d 347 (1966).
23. 240 Ark. 143, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966).
24. Id. at 144, 398 S.W.2d at 539.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 145, 398 S.W.2d at 540.
28. Id. at 147, 398 S.W.2d at 541-42.
29. Id. at 148, 398 S.W.2d at 542.
30. Id.
31. Id. See also Weaver v. O'Meara Motor Co., 452 P.2d 87 (Alas. 1969); Universal
C.I.T. Credit Co. v. Rone, 248 Ark. 665, 453 S.W.2d 37 (1970); Carter v. Ryburn Ford Sales
Inc., 248 Ark. 236, 451 S.W.2d 199 (1970) (same theory applied to a case involving the failure
to comply with a non-notice provision); Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. 382,
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Cases Denying Deficiency Judgments
Courts denying deficiency judgments following the resale of
collateral without prior notice to the debtor rely upon two different
theories. In several Georgia decisions courts have relied on the
theory of accord and satisfaction. For example, in Moody v. Nides
Fin. Co.32 the debtor purchased a car and sent the monthly payment
to the finance company which had purchased the chattel paper. The
finance company, alleging that a default had occurred, refused to
accept the payment and repossessed the car. 31 It later resold the car
34
without notifying the debtor.
The court reasoned that the finance company's refusal of payment and its acceptance of the car amounted to an accord and
satisfaction.3 5 Regarding the Code, the court stated:
We are content to rest the matter on the accord and satisfaction which these facts would authorize a jury to find
though it appears that we would likely have reached the
3
same result by applying UCC provisions. 1
The leading case relying on the UCC to deny a deficiency judgment for failure to comply with the 9-504 notice requirements is
Skeels v. Universal C.I. T. Credit Corp. 7 In that case, the debtor, a
car dealer, sought refinancing and approached the secured party, a
38
finance institution which had floor-planned the debtor's inventory.
The secured party's agent informed the debtor that a new loan had
276 A.2d 402 (1971); T. & W. Ice Cream Inc. v. Carriage Barn Inc., 107 N.J. Super. 328, 258
A.2d 162 (1969); Investors Acceptance Co. v. James Talcott Inc., 454 S.W.2d 130 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1969).
32. 115 Ga. App. 859, 156 S.E.2d 310 (1967).
33. Id. at 860, 156 S.E.2d at 311.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 861, 156 S.E.2d at 312. Because the accord and satisfaction argument does
not rely on the UCC, it will not be considered in the remainder of this note. It seems, however,
that courts rely more upon estoppel than upon an impossible unilateral accord and satisfaction. For example, in the Moody case, the debtor acted in good faith and was only slightly in
arrears in payments. There was no real default or repossession, and the finance company left
the impression that it was retaining the car in lieu of the debt.
For other cases relying on accord and satisfaction in theory, but seemingly more concerned with estoppel, see Smith v. Singleton, 124 Ga. App. 394, 184 S.E.2d 26 (1971); Trailmobile Div. of Pullman Inc. v. Jones, 118 Ga. App. 472, 164 S.E.2d 346 (1968) (concurring
opinion); L.W. Johnson v. Commercial Credit Corp., 117 Ga. App. 131, 159 S.E.2d 290 (1968).
37. 999 F Rinn 6F9 (W.f. Pn. 1963). rev'd in part, 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1964).
38. Id. at 696-97.
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been approved." The debtor continued to deliver all security instruments to the secured party.4" Claiming the debtor had defaulted on
several individual security agreements, the secured party repossessed4 1 and sold all the cars on the debtor's lot without notifying
the debtor.2 The debtor then brought an action seeking compensatory and punitive damages against the secured party for destroying
his business. In a counterclaim the secured party sought a deficiency judgment. 3
In its denial of the deficiency judgment, the court based its
decision on two grounds. First, to grant a deficiency judgment when
the secured party failed to give notice of the sale would be to perpetuate the evils existing under the pre-Code law.44 Second, the failure
to give notice deprived the debtor of the opportunity to redeem the
collateral under 9-506. 41
A Synopsis of the Arguments
The major arguments for allowing deficiency judgments even if
the secured party fails to notify the debtor of the resale are summarized as follows:
(1) The solution to the problem lies in the Code, its comments
and the cases decided under the Code. The pre-Code law is of no
significance since the Code departs from the old formulas. Under
the Code, a deficiency judgment is not expressly prohibited."6
(2) The Code explicitly authorizes damages in 9-507 if the
secured party fails to give notice. The damages allowed are adequate to protect the debtor's interests. 7
39. Id. at 697.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 698.
42. Id. at 702.
43. Id. at 696.
44. Id. at 702.
45. Id. For other cases denying a deficiency judgment on the basis of the debtor's loss
of the right of 9-506 redemption, see Edmondson v. Air Serv. Co., 123 Ga. App. 263, 180
S.E.2d 589 (1971); Motor Contract Co. v. Sawyer, 123 Ga. App. 207, 180 S.E.2d 282 (1971);
T.J. Braswell v. American Nat'l Bank, 117 Ga. App. 699, 161 S.E.2d 420 (1968).
For another case denying a deficiency judgment, although no reasons were given, see
Morris Plan Co. v. Johnson, 271 N.E.2d 404 (Il1. Ct. App. 1971).
46. White, Representing the Low-Income Consumer in Repossession, Resales and Deficiency Judgment Cases, 3 UCC L.J. 199, 209 (1970-71).
47. Id. at 220. See also Hogan, Pitfalls in Default Procedure, 86 BANKING L.J. 965, 978
(1969); Posel, Sales and Sales Financing, 16 RUTGERs L. Rv. 329, 346 (1962).
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(3) Denial of a deficiency judgment deprives the secured party
of his right "to be made whole" as stated in 1-106(1).4s
The arguments for denying deficiency judgments are as follows:
(1) The solution to the question is found in the pre-Code law
where under comparable circumstances a deficiency judgment was
denied ."
(2) Several state statutes which contain provisions governing
repossession and sale deny deficiency judgments when notice of the
resale is not given. 0
(3) The forfeiture of a deficiency judgment is a deterrent to
the secured party's noncompliance with the sale provisions of 9504.51
(4) Failure to give notice denies the debtor his right of redemption; consequently, the secured party should lose any right to
a deficiency judgment."2
An analysis of these arguments indicates that the conclusion
allowing a deficiency judgment is more persuasive than that which
denies such a judgment. The purpose of the remainder of this note
is to substantiate this opinion. The argument relying on pre-Code
law will be rejected, and specific UCC provisions will be discussed
in order to find a solution consistent with the policy of the Code.
PRE-CODE LAW
The major argument for denial of a deficiency judgment involves repeated references to pre-Code law. Under the Uniform Conditional Sales Act,53 the creditor could retake possession of the goods
if the debtor defaulted." Assuming the debtor did not redeem the
48.
Uniform
49.
part, 335
Misc. 2d
50.
51.
52.
part, 335
53.
54.

Russell, The Damage Award for Improper Distribution of Collateral Under the
Commercial Code, 49 ORE. L. Rsv. 65, 69 (1969).
Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa. 1963), rev'd in
F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1964); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66
1089, 323 N.Y.S.2d 13 (Civ. Ct. 1971); White, supra note 46, at 220.
White, supra note 46, at 224.
Posel, supra note 47, at 345.
Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa. 1963), rev'd in
F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1964).
Hereinafter cited as UCSA and referred to as UCSA.
UCSA § 16 provides that
[when, the h,uye ch11 he in rpfi11t in thp nnvmpnt nf nv sulm due] uindipr the
contract, or in the performance of any other condition which the contract requires
him to perform in order to obtain the property in the goods, or in the performance of
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collateral,55 the UCSA envisioned two possible resales: compulsory56
and voluntary.5 7 In either case, the creditor had to comply with
8
elaborate notice requirements.
The UCSA provided that if the creditor failed to comply with
the resale provisions, the debtor could recover from the creditor his
actual damages (if any), but in no case less than one quarter of
the sum of all payments made under the contract, including interest.59 The UCSA did not explicitly mention what effect the creditor's
noncompliance with the resale provision might have on his subsequent right to a deficiency judgment. 0 The courts, however, ruled
that if the creditor failed to comply with the resale provisions (including the notice requirements) in either a compulsory or voluntary
resale, he was precluded from obtaining a deficiency judgment;' the
resale was considered void and the indebtedness discharged."
Reliance on the pre-Code UCSA 3 is the basis of a major argument for denying deficiency judgments under the UCC. According
to this argument, the UCSA treated the question of the debtor's
liability for a deficiency judgment and the creditor's liability for
failure to comply with resale provisions in sequences of sections
any promise the breach of which is by the contract expressly made a ground for the
retaking of the goods, the seller may retake possession thereof.
55. UCSA §§ 17, 18.
56. UCSA § 19 provides that
[i]f the buyer does not redeem the goods within ten days after the seller has retaken
possession, and the buyer has paid at least fifty percent of the purchase price at the
time of the retaking, the seller shall sell them at public auction.
57. UCSA § 20 provides that "[tihe seller may voluntarily resell the goods for account
of the buyer on compliance with the same requirements [of § 19] ....
58. UCSA § 19.
59. UCSA § 25 provides that
[i]f the seller fails to comply with the provisions of Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 23
after retaking the goods, the buyer may recover from the seller his actual damages,
if any, and in no event less than one-fourth of the sum of all payments which have
been made under the contract, with interest.
60. The right to a deficiency judgment is stated in UCSA § 22:
If the proceeds of the resale are not sufficient to defray the expenses thereof, and also
the expenses of retaking, keeping and storing the goods and the balance due upon
the purchase price, the seller may recover the deficiency from the buyer, or from
anyone who has succeeded to the obligations of the buyer.
61. Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 15 (1956).
62. Some courts allowed an additional damage penalty. For a discussion of the two
conflicting series of decisions on this added penalty, see Farmers Bank v. Odom, 246 A.2d
85, 88 (Del. Super. Ct. 1968).
63. Several states did not repeal the UCSA upon enactment of the UCC. In this sense
it may technically be inaccurate to refer to the UCSA as "pre-Code" law.
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basically comparable to the sequence of 9-504(3) and 9-507(1)."
Therefore, the argument goes, the UCC did not alter this link
between required notice and the right to a deficiency judgment.
Finally, advocates of this argument deny that 9-507 is presently the
debtor's sole remedy; they indicate that a provision similar to 9-507
existed in the UCSA and that deficiency judgments were still denied.65
Reliance on the pre-Code decisions is of questionable value
when considering a similar problem under the UCC. The UCSA
does not expressly provide a solution to the question of the effect
of failure to give notice of resale on the secured party's right to a
deficiency judgment, and its draftsmen apparently did not consider the problem." In addition, courts under the UCSA did not
discuss adequately the reasons for their decisions. The requirement
of giving proper notice of resale as being a condition precedent to a
deficiency judgment might have been assumed to be so obvious that
it did not require an explanation. 7 However, courts deciding the
question under the Code should not be governed by decisions explained inadequately under a law which, absent judicial decisions,
did not explicitly resolve the question.
More importantly, the UCC was enacted because the stringent
system of regulation under the UCSA had failed."8 The UCSA had
established burdensome requirements which had little practical
benefit. 9 As the official comment to 9-101 indicates, the UCC was
designed to supersede prior legislation such as the UCSA. The
UCC's chief goal was to provide "a simple and unified structure
within which the immense variety of present-day secured financing
transactions can go forward with less cost and with greater certainty." 0
Furthermore, the purposes of the notice requirements under the
UCSA and the UCC are fundamentally different. Under the UCSA
two types of notice were required: notice to the buyer and notice to
64. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 17, at 1264.
65. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc. 2d 1089, 323
N.Y.S.2d 13 (Civ. Ct. 1971).
66. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 17, at 1264.
67. Id. at 1263.
68. Gilmore, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code Part V-Default, 7 CONS. ON
P~ "~. .A

, 7 (19)1

69. Id.
70. UCC § 9-101, Comment.
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the public. The UCSA insisted on public resales and auctions.7 If
the creditor failed to give notice of the resale, the very policy of
having public resales would be defeated. Obviously the public cannot attend a resale without proper notification. Under the UCSA the
harshness of the penalty to the creditor matched the harshness of
the consequences of his actions.
Under the UCC, however, the purposes of the notice requirements are different.72 The Code adopts the more liberal notice provisions of the former Uniform Trusts Receipts Act.7" Section 9-504
does not delineate exacting requirements but, instead, refers to
"reasonable notice" to the debtor. Private resales, not public resales, are the goal of 9-504.11
Since private resales are encouraged and the only notice required to be given the debtor is notice of the time after which the
private resale is to be made,75 notice appears to assume a lesser role
under the UCC than it did under the UCSA. The secured party
could fail to give notice of the private resale and still sell the collateral through accepted commercial channels. In any given case the
amount realized in a private resale could be the same whether or
not notice was given. The debtor is protected even when notice is
not given by the limited ability of the secured party to purchase at
the private resale." When compared with the situation under the
UCSA, the consequences of failing to give notice are less harsh and
the resulting penalty should be correspondingly less severe.
A final difference between the UCSA and the Code relates to
the purpose of denying a deficiency judgment. Under the UCSA
denial of a deficiency judgment was intended to operate as a deterrent and was consequently penal in nature. On the other hand, the
Code specifically rejects the notion of penal damages in most instances:
The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally admin71. UCSA § 19.
72. UCC § 9-504, Comment 1.
73. Id.
74. Id. Comments 1, 6.
75. Id. § 9-504(3).
76. According to UCC § 9-504(3),
[tihe secured party may buy at any public sale and if the collateral is of a type
customarily sold in a recognized market or is a type which is the subject of widely
distributed standard price quotations he may buy at private sale.
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istered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in
as good a position as if the other party had fully performed
but neither consequential or special nor penal damages
may be had except as specifically provided in this Act or
by other rule of law."
A similar reference to the law of chattel mortgages is likewise
unavailing. A chattel mortgagee had to give the chattel mortgagor
notice prior to the sale of the item which was the subject of a chattel
mortgage. If the chattel mortgagee was considered to have had a
lien to secure the loan, failure to notify the chattel mortgagor prior
to the sale resulted in a forfeiture of the right to a deficiency judgment. 9
A contrary result was reached in those jurisdictions if the mortgagee had legal title to the mortgaged goods, subject only to the
chattel mortgagor's equitable or statutory right of redemption."0 A
failure to follow statutory provisions with respect to sale, including
notice, did not result in the loss of the deficiency judgment.8 ' The
measure of the chattel mortgagor's damages was the difference between the fair market value of the goods and the proceeds of the
sale."2
These arguments are of little significance when considering the
problem from the viewpoint of 9-504. Not only has the UCC superseded the law relating to chattel mortgages,8 3 but under the UCC
the rights and duties of the parties are treated without reference to
where "title" to the collateral is located.8 4 Although a lien-title dichotomy was determinative under the chattel mortgage law, it is of
77. UCC § 1-106. Professor Gilmore has argued that under the UCC both contract and
tort damages can be collected and that tort damages are in effect punitive. He cites the Skeels
decision (see notes 37-45 supra and accompanying text) as an indication how punitive damages may be sought under 9-507(1); he further states that 1-106 is outflanked by calling these
damages "tort" damages. See 2 G. GLMORE, supra note 17, at 1256.
Professor Gilmore's argument is not inconsistent with the position taken in this note. It
is one thing, as in the exceptional case of Skeels, to ask for tort damages. It is quite another
to call forfeiture of a deficiency judgment "damages." One can seek to circumvent 1-106 by
asking for tort damages and still not be allowed to deny the secured party his right to a
deficiency judgment.
78. Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 539 (1953).
79. Franklin Nat'l Bank v. Austin, 104 A.2d 742, 744 (N.H. Ct. App. 1954).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Veterans Loan Authority v. Wilk, 6i N.J. Super. 65, 69, 1W A.2d 130, 142 (1960).
83. UCC § 9-101, Comment.
84. UCC §§ 2-706, Comment 3; 9-202, Comment 1; 9-507, Comment.
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no assistance under the UCC since the distinction between lien and
title has been eliminated.
One final reference can be made to non-Code law. It has been
argued that a deficiency judgment should be denied under the UCC
because several state statutes specifically preclude the deficiency
judgment penalty in consumer retail sales contexts. 5 One such statute is the Illinois Retail Installment Sales Act,88 which is patterned
more after the UCSA than the UCC. As a result, primary emphasis
is placed on a public sale. Illinois courts have held that the failure
to meet the notice requirements as to transactions under the scope
of the Illinois Act results in a forfeiture of any right to a deficiency
judgment.87
Reference to state statutes such as the Illinois Retail Installment Sales Act is of marginal value. These state statutes take precedence over the UCC 8 -Article 9 does not supersede state retail
installment sales acts. This deference is necessary because consumer installment sales and loans "present special problems of a
nature which makes special regulation of them inappropriate in a
general commercial codification. "8
APPLICATION OF THE UCC

Assuming that pre-Code law is not controlling and therefore of
little significance, the crucial analysis of the issue involves the application of appropriate rules and policies of Article 9. Analysis of a
Code provision outside Article 9 substantiates the proposition that
failure to give notice should not result in the loss of a right to a
deficiency judgment under Part V of Article 9.
A notice provision in Article 2 (more specifically, 2-706) is simi85. See White, supra note 46, at 224.
86. Illinois Retail Installment Sales Act §§ 23 and 25, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
1211/2, §§ 247-49 (1965).
87. Northern Trust Co. v. Kuykendall, 273 N.E.2d 526 (Ill. Ct. App. 1971).
88. UCC § 9-203(4).
89. Id. § 9-101, Comment. It must be remembered that these acts apply only when the
"debtor" is a consumer, and they do not change the applicability of Article 9 regarding
businessmen, merchants, jobbers or other industrial or commercial debtors. This is not to
suggest, however, that the consideration of state retail sales acts is not important. Professor
Gilmore, citing Alliance Discount Corp. v. Shaw, 195 Pa. Super. 601, 171 A.2d 548 (1961),
notes that the UCC and retail installment sales acts often work in "double harness." "For
the secured party's failure to comply with the Article 9 provisions or standards the consumerdebtor could recover under the more liberal [retail installment sales act] sanctions." 2 G.
GILMORE, supra note 17, at 1261.
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lar to 9-504. If the buyer wrongfully rejects or revokes acceptance of
goods or fails to make preliminary delivery payments, one of the
seller's remedies is to sell the goods and recover damages." According to 2-706, if the seller elects to sell the goods at a private sale, he
must give the buyer reasonable notification of his intention to sell."
The seller need not, however, notify the buyer of the time and place
of the sale. 2
The notice requirements of 9-504 and 2-706 are essentially the
same regarding public sales. These provisions require that the secured party (or seller) give the debtor (or buyer) reasonable notice
of the time and place of the sale. The purpose of these notice requirements is to provide the debtor (or buyer) an opportunity to bid
at the sale or procure attendance of other bidders to insure the
highest possible sale price. 3
A 2-706 sale made in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner (including compliance with the notice requirements) is
an express condition precedent to the seller's right to recover the
difference between the sale price and the contract price. 4 Two leading cases indicate that the seller's failure to give notice of the sale
results in the forfeiture of this 2-706(1) right. 5
The result of the failure to give notice under 9-504 need not be
the same as that under 2-706; there are at least two distinctions
between the provisions. First, 2-706 expressly states that before the
seller can recover the difference between the sale price and the
contract price, the seller must have conducted the sale in good faith
and in a commercially reasonable manner. As noted earlier, 9-504
does not create any explicit condition precedent to a secured party's
right to a deficiency judgment. Second, if a seller does not give
notice under 2-706, he forfeits his 2-706(1) right to collect the differ90. UCC § 2-703(d).
91. Id. § 2-706(3).
92. Id. Comment 8.In comparing 2-706 and 9-504, it isrecognized that each section's
context is different. In 9-504 the Code is concerned (among other things) with preserving the
debtor's equity in the collateral-a concern of little or no importance under 2-706.
93. Id. See also Nelson v. Monarch Inv. Plan, 452 S.W.2d 375 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970).
94. UCC § 2-706(1).
95. Foster v. Colorado Radio Corp., 381 F.2d 222 (10th Cir. 1967); Portal Galleries Inc.
v. Tomar Prods, Inc., 60 Misc. 2d 523, 302 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
96. UCC § 2-706(1) provides that "[wihere the resale is made in good faith and in a
com.ercia!y reaonable rannpr.the qpllpr may recover the difference between the resale
price and the contract price."
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ence between the sale price and the contract price. 7 The seller,
however, is not without a remedy-he merely loses the right to use
the sale price as an absolute measure of damages. He may still
recover damages based on the market value of the goods under 2708.11
This comparison between 2-706 and 9-504 illustrates that the
drafters of the Code did not intend to deprive the secured party (or
seller) of all rights should he fail to comply with duties owed to the
debtor (or buyer). In 2-706 the seller does not lose his interest in the
collateral if he fails to comply with the sale provisions. Section 9504 is analogous to 2-706, and it can be argued that the secured
party's failure to give notice should not result in his loss of a deficiency judgment.
This rule, which allows the secured party to retain his interest
in the collateral despite his failure to comply with duties owed the
debtor, underlies 9-207 and 9-208. Section 9-207 delineates the secured party's responsibilities to the debtor when the secured party
acquires possession of the collateral either before or after the
debtor's default." If the secured party fails to meet requirements of
9-207, he can be held liable for any resulting loss. The secured party
does not, however, lose his security interest. 00 Similarly, 9-208 provides that the debtor may require the secured party to produce a
statement of account or a list of the collateral being held by the
secured party. 0'° The penalty for noncompliance, like the penalty of
9-507(1), is limited to damages based upon actual loss. 02
The secured party's right to a deficiency judgment is the extent
of his remaining interest in the collateral. Sections 2-706, 9-207 and
9-208 illustrate a Code policy of allowing the secured party to retain
his interest in the goods or collateral despite his failure to comply
with the obligations owed the debtor. In light of this policy, the
secured party should not lose his right to a deficiency judgment for
failing to give the required 9-504(3) notice of resale.
97. UCC § 2-706, Comment 2.
98. Id.
99. Id. § 9-207, Comment 4.
100. UCC § 9-207(3) provides that "[a] secured party is liable for any loss caused by
his failure to meet any obligation imposed by the preceding subsections but does not lose his
security interest."
101. UCC § 9-208(1).
102. Id. § 9-208(2).
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The Question Viewed from Article 9, Part V
Two major arguments for denying a deficiency judgment can be
inferred from the remedial provisions of Part V of Article 9. First, a
deficiency judgment should be denied because the secured party's
failure to give notice deprives the debtor of his right to redeem the
collateral. 0 3 The second argument is that denial of deficiency judgments acts as a deterrent against commercially unreasonable behavior on the part of the secured party.' 4
There are, however, at least two major instances in which the
failure to notify the debtor will not result in the debtor's loss of a
right to redeem the collateral. The debtor has a right to redeem until
the secured party has disposed of the collateral, has entered into a
contract to dispose of the collateral or has become entitled to retain
the collateral in discharge of the debt under 9-505.105 Unless the

collateral has actually been sold to a good faith purchaser for value
and the debtor's interest thus terminated,' 6 an improper disposition
does not cut off the debtor's right to redeem.' 7 If the secured party
has purchased the collateral or the collateral has not been placed
in a purchaser's hands, the debtor still has a right to redeem. Second, the debtor retains a right to redeem if the secured party disposes of the collateral in units or by more than one contract;'0 even
if part of the collateral is sold, the debtor may redeem the remainder.'0 Therefore, if the secured party resells a portion of the collateral without complying with the notice requirements of 9-504, the
debtor will nonetheless be able to redeem the remaining collateral.
The argument that 9-507 remedies are inadequate to deter the
secured party from noncompliance with the resale provisions of 9504 can also be challenged. Section 9-507 provides for judicial review
of the resale both before and after it has taken place."10 This judicial
review is the ultimate safeguard against any violation of the debtor's
103. Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa. 1963), rev'd
in part, 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1964).
104. Farmers Bank v. Odom, 246 A.2d 85, 88 (Del. Super. Ct. 1968); see also Posel,
supra note 47, at 345.
105. UCC § 9-506.
106. Id. § 9-504(4).
107. See 2 G. GimioRE, supra note 17, at 1256.
108. UCC § 9-504(3) provides that "[d]isposition of the collateral may be by public
or private proceedings and may be made by way of one or more contracts. Sale or other
109.
110.

L. LAKIN & H. BERGER, A GUIDE TO SECURED TRANSACTIONS 192 (1970).
UCC § 9-507.
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rights."' By the provisions of 9-507(1), "[i]f it is established that
the secured party is not proceeding in accordance with the provisions of this Part disposition may be ordered or restrained on appropriate terms and conditions.""' As noted earlier, neither this provision nor its comments state that the secured party's commercially
unreasonable behavior before the resale will deprive him of the right
to sell the collateral or collect a subsequent deficiency judgment,
whereas such conduct may well make him liable for damages under
9-507 or 9-207.
In the event the collateral is consumer goods, the debtor can
collect actual damages, and at a minimum, the credit charge plus
ten percent of the principal or the time price differential plus ten
percent of the cash price."' As a result, a debtor may collect damages in excess of the actual loss. Such penalties are calculated on
the original principal and total interest charge. In purchases with
terms of three years or longer, the interest charge constitutes a
significant part of the total price. In these cases the penalties may
114
be sufficient to eliminate the deficiency.
The adequacy of the debtor's remedy in 9-507 can also be illustrated in those cases in which 9-505 requires the secured party to
resell the collateral. If the secured party fails to comply with 9-505,
111. Lakin & Berger, The Secured Party: Enforcement of His Security Interest Under
Article 9 After the Debtor's Default, 8 AM. Bus. L.J. 1, 22 (1970).
Again a distinction should be made between theory and reality. The value of this provision may be limited because of the unlikelihood the debtor will learn of the secured party's
improper disposition before the sale. See Note, Remedies on Default Under the Proposed
Uniform Commercial Code as Compared to Remedies Under ConditionalSales, 39 MARQ. L.
REv. 246, 265 (1956).
Section 9-507 judicial review remains an available check on the secured party's conduct.
As pointed out in the Brief Amicus Curiae of Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform
Commercial Code in the pending appeal of Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972),
a business debtor in most instances can avail himself of this remedy, and with the advent of
legal service lawyers, it is becoming readily available to the indigent debtor. See Brief for
Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code as Amicus Curiae at Appendix
B, 6, Adams v. Southern California First Nat'l Bank, appeal docketed sub nom No. 72-1484,
9th Cir., March 15, 1972.
112. UCC § 9-507(1).
113. Id.
114. See White, supra note 46, at 218-19. In respect to this possibility, Professor Gilmore
has noted:
If repossession took place before much had been paid the recovery of 10% plus the
financing charges could perfectly well exceed the payments. In such a case, at least,
the Code provision would amount to a real penalty.
2 G. GILMORE, supra note 17, at 1260.
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the debtor may recover damages either under 9-507 or in conversion
under 9-505(1). As one commentator has noted,
[i]ts effect [the choice of 9-507 damages or 9-505(1) conversion] is to give the buyer an option to recover between
two amounts, thus putting him in the advantageous position of being able to pick the remedy which will give him
the greatest amount of damages, and consequently, provide
the seller with an effective incentive to abide by the terms
of the Code."'
ARGUMENTS DENYING DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS RECONSIDERED

An analysis of the cases which have denied deficiency judgments after a secured party has sold collateral without giving written notice to the debtor indicates that perhaps the courts have
viewed a secured party's failure to give notice from certain preconceived notions of fairness and equity. This is particularly evident
when the Norton"6 and Skeels"7 decisions are reconsidered.
The court in Norton,"' which would allow the secured party a
deficiency judgment, was obviously influenced by its own notion of
fair play. In that case, the debtor-car dealer was not given an opportunity to repurchase the chattel paper which he had sold to the bank
with recourse even though he had always repurchased the paper in
the past."9 The bank was unable to explain why it chose that particular instance to act without notifying Norton.12 " At one point the
court explicitly discussed the fairness aspect of the case:
Upon the issue of Norton's damages simple considerations
of fair play cast the burden of proof upon the bank. It was
the bank which wrongfully disposed of the car without notice to the debtors. Thus it was the bank's action that made
it at least difficult, if not impossible, for Norton to prove
115. Note, supra note 111, at 266.
116. 240 Ark. 743, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966).
117. 222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa. 1963), rev'd in part, 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1964).
118. Norton v. National Bank, 240 Ark. 743, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966). In that case the
assignor of a conditional sales contract was held entitled to 9-504(3) notice when the assignee
of the chattel paper repossessed and sold the collateral after the debtor's default. The court
held that the assignee was entitled to a deficiency judgment. In the absence of a showing of
the resale value of the collateral had notice been given, however, a presumption that the
collateral was worth the amount of the outstanding debt would prevail.
119. Id. at 744, 398 S.W.2d at 53UJ.
120. Id.
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the extent of his loss with reasonable certainty. It would be
manifestly unfair for the creditor to derive an advantage
from its own misconduct.''
A similar passage is found in the Skeels'2 2 decision, which
reached an opposite conclusion and denied a deficiency judgment.
Considering the extraordinary circumstances in Skeels, it is not
surprising that a deficiency judgment was denied. The crucial question in that case was whether the credit company, by repossessing
the debtor's entire inventory, intended to force the debtor out of
business.2 3 In affirming the denial of a deficiency judgment, but
reversing the award of punitive damages to the debtor, the court of
appeals explained the role of fairness in the decisions:
These provisions [sections 1-103 and 1-203, dealing with
the applicability of equity principles and the obligation of
good faith] superimpose a general requirement of fundamental integrity in commercial transactions regulated by
the Code. In the present case a jury could not easily avoid
the conclusion that it would be grossly improper and inconsistent with good faith dealing for a secured creditor, aware
that his debtor had defaulted on currently due loan repayments, to persist in assurance that he was about the make
further advances of needed operating capital, and then,
without notice, exercise his security rights to seize the de24
linquent debtor's entire stock in trade.'
In addition to the considerations of fairness and good faith, an
unstated reason underlying the decisions appears to be that the
secured party's failure to give notice forced the court to consider
certain imponderables. The debtors could not prove the extent of
their damages with certainty.'2 The debtors might have claimed
that the secured parties' failure to give notice deprived them of their
121. Id. at 747, 398 S.W.2d at 542 (emphasis added).
122. Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa. 1963), rev'd
in part, 335 F.3d 846 (2d Cir. 1964). In Skeels, the secured party-finance company's repossession of part of the debtor-car dealer's inventory had the effect of putting the debtor out of
business.
123. Id. at 698.
124. Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 335 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir. 1964).
125. The court in Norton v. National Bank, 240 Ark. 743, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966) referred
to this, saying: "Thus it was the bank's action that made it at least difficult, if not impossible,
for Norton to prove the extent of his loss with reasonable certainty." Id. at 747, 398 S.W.2d
at 542.
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right to redeem and prevented them from procuring bidders and
buyers at the respective resale. Consequently, the courts would have
been obliged to speculate what might have happened had notice
been given in each case. Since the secured parties could have prevented this by complying with the simple notice requirements, the
courts were probably inclined to deny the requested deficiency judgments.
Responding to the above arguments, two points should be
stressed. First, contrary to the Norton opinion, allowing the secured
party to reserve a deficiency judgment does not allow him to take
advantage of his own misconduct. A secured party may not initially
enter the transaction unless he is assured that he can obtain a
deficiency judgment upon default. The secured party's right to the
deficiency judgment is created when the debtor defaults and is not
a product of the secured party's misconduct. Second, permitting the
secured party to recover a deficiency judgment and limiting the
debtor to 9-507(1) damages is fair and consistent with good faith
since the secured party is penalized by having to pay damages and
yet is allowed to collect the outstanding amount. Damages under 9507(1), when coupled with judicial review, adequately protect the
debtor's interest.
CONCLUSION

After considering the arguments on both sides, this writer concludes that the secured party should not forfeit his right to a deficiency judgment when he fails to give the debtor notice of resale.
Allowing a deficiency judgment under these circumstances is consistent with the underlying purpose of the UCC; the Code was adopted
to eliminate the restrictions of the pre-Code law and to substitute
flexibility and commercial reasonableness for the rigidity and formalism of the prior law. 2 ' In view of these purposes, denial of a
deficiency judgment is a harsh result. The reasons for a secured
party's noncompliance with the 9-504(3) notice requirements may
be varied, ranging from accidental or inadvertent omissions of relatively minor and inconsequential requirements to deliberate and
possibly fraudulent acts aimed at injuring the debtor's interests. If
deficiency judgments are denied in all cases, all the possible reasons
for not complying with the notice provisions will be treated the
126.

See Gilmore, supra note 68, at 7.
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same. It would seem to be better to use 9-507(1) damages and treat
each problem on a case-by-case basis.
The damage provisions of 9-507(1) adequately protect the
debtor. The judicial review offered by this section has the ultimate
effect of safeguarding the rights of both parties. The secured party
can be protected by obtaining prior judicial approval of his proposed
method of disposition, thus virtually ensuring that it will be commercially reasonable. The debtor can obtain judicial review of the
method of disposition both prior to and subsequent to the resale. In
this manner, the creditor is given maximum freedom of action without compromising the protection afforded the debtor.
If the secured party does not lose his right to a deficiency judgment because of the failure to give adequate notice of the resale, it
is up to the courts to decide whether the Norton approach should
be adopted. According to the Norton decision, the secured party is
not denied a deficiency judgment if he fails to give notice. He must,
however, overcome the presumption that, had the collateral been
properly resold, it would have brought a price equal to the amount
of the debt. In a majority of cases decided under the Norton approach, the secured party has failed to meet this burden and in
effect has lost the deficiency judgment.'2
Regardless of whether the courts follow the Norton decision, a
secured party should not be denied the right to a deficiency judgment under these circumstances. The Code must function on the
theory that the overwhelming number of commercial transactions
are executed in good faith,'18 and this assumption is most likely
accurate. 12 1 In those relatively few instances in which the secured
party, for whatever reason, has failed to comply with 9-504(3) notice
requirements, it is better to adopt a flexible standard which would
allow the secured party to be made whole and yet which would
protect the debtor on a case-by-case basis. This protection is already
afforded by 9-507; such protection does not require an additional
judicially created penalty denying the secured party's right to a
deficiency judgment.
127. For cases where the creditor failed to meet the burden, see L.W. Johnson v. Commercial Credit Corp., 117 Ga. App. 131, 159 S.E.2d 290 (1968); Gallatin Trust and Savings
Bank v. Darrah, 152 Mont. 256, 448 P.2d 734 (1968); Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 60
Misc. 2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Civ. Ct. 1969). For a case where the creditor met the burden,
see Weaver v. O'Meara Motor Co., 452 P.2d 87 (Alas. 1969).
128. See Gilmore, supra note 68, at 11.
129. See Lakin & Berger, supra note 111, at 1.
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